

# Windows Memory Analysis

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# Agenda

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- Introduction to Memory Analysis
- Memory Acquisition
- Key Memory Components
- Volatility Framework
- Windows Memory Analysis

# Introduction to Memory Analysis

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# What is Memory Forensics?

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- **Definition:**

- The process of analyzing a computer's RAM (Random Access Memory) to uncover digital evidence related to security incidents, cybercrimes, or forensic investigations.
- Unlike disk forensics, which examines stored data on physical media, memory forensics focuses on volatile data that resides in the system's active memory.
- RAM holds real-time and volatile information about running processes, open network connections, and active user sessions.
- Memory forensics allows investigators to retrieve valuable insights into recent system activities, malware presence, and unauthorized access.

# Memory forensics role in malware analysis

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# Memory Forensics Steps

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- **Memory Acquisition**
  - Dumping memory from the target machine
    - DumpIt
    - FTK Imager
    - Winpmem
  
- **Memory Analysis**
  - Analyzing the memory file
    - Volatility Framework

# Memory Acquisition

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# Pre-Acquisition Process

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- DO NOT POWER OFF
- Acquisition tools should be executed from an external device
- The memory dump must be stored in an external drive



# Memory Acquisition Process

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- Determine the state of the machine
- Identify the operating system
- Insert acquisition media & perform the Volatile Memory Dump
- Hash and verify the acquired files
- Create Investigator copies
- Always work on a copy

# Other Memory Locations in Windows Systems

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- **Pagefile.sys:**

- **Location:** %SystemDrive%\pagefile.sys
- **Purpose:** Acts as virtual memory, extending the available RAM by using a portion of the hard drive.
- **Size:** Configurable by the user or automatically managed by the system.
- **Content:** Holds data that doesn't fit in physical RAM, transferring less frequently used memory pages.
- **Impact on Forensics:** Contains artifacts reflecting the system's memory usage and may store sensitive information.

- **Hiberfil.sys:**

- **Location:** Typically found in the root directory of the system drive (%SystemDrive%/hiberfil.sys).
- **Purpose:** Used for hibernation, storing the system's state when it enters hibernation mode.
- **Size:** Approximately equal to the amount of physical RAM on the system.
- **Content:** Contains the contents of the system's memory when hibernation is initiated.
- **Impact on Forensics:** Valuable for memory analysis as it preserves the system's state.

# Hybrid sleep, Hibernation, Sleep

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- **Hybrid Sleep:**

- Combines benefits of sleep and hibernation.
- Saves RAM content to a hibernation file during low-power transition.
- Fast resume if connected to power; hibernation file preserves data during power loss.

- **Hibernation:**

- Saves RAM content to a hibernation file.
- Lowest low-power state; longer resume time than regular sleep.
- Hibernation file includes on-the-fly encryption keys for crypto containers and encrypted VM apps.

- **Sleep:**

- Minimal power consumption.
- Fast startup upon waking.
- Instantly resumes where you left off.
- Automatic work-saving feature.
- Protects against battery drain by shutting down when low.

# Shutdown vs Restart

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- **Shutdown:**

- NOT really a shutdown
- State of RAM is written to hard disk and then read back into ram when system starts
- Hibernation-like

- **Restart:**

- **Clears RAM**
- Does not read state of windows when system restarts
- Windows 8+ take longer to restart

- **Fast startup:**


- Windows 10+
- Reduced time to boot after gracious shut down
- Saves a small hibernation file onto the disk – kernel memory

# Memory Dump Acquisition Tools

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- **Winpmem:**
  - **Description:** Open-source memory acquisition tool for Windows systems.
- **Belkasoft Live RAM Capturer:**
  - **Description:** A tool for capturing the content of the computer's volatile memory (RAM) and saving it to a file.
- **Dumplt:**
  - **Description:** A compact utility to acquire physical memory (RAM) on a Windows system.
- **FTK Imager:**
  - **Description:** A powerful and easy-to-use tool for acquiring physical memory or creating disk images.
- **Magnet RAM Capture:**
  - **Description:** A free utility to capture the physical memory of a suspect's computer into a memory dump file.

# Memory Dump Acquisition Tools



```
Administrator: Command Prompt

04% 0xEF66000 .
Padding from 0xFEE7000 to 0xFF77000
pad
- length: 0x90000

04% 0xFEE7000 .
copy_memory
- start: 0xFF77000
- end: 0xC000000

04% 0xFF77000 .....
20% 0x41F77000 .....
36% 0x73F77000 .....
51% 0xA5F77000 .....
Padding from 0xC0000000 to 0x100000000
pad
- length: 0x40000000

50% 0xC0000000 .....
50% 0xC0000000 .....
copy_memory
- start: 0x100000000
- end: 0x140000000

80% 0x100000000 .....
95% 0x132000000 .....
The system time is: 16:56:30
Driver Unloaded.
```

# Memory Acquisition from Virtual Machine

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- **Suspend** the VM and copy the following files:
  - VMware (.vmdk)
    - .vmem file = raw memory image
    - .vmss = vmware saved state (suspend VM)
    - .vmsn = vmware snapshot file
  - Microsoft Hyper-V (.vhdx)
    - .bin file = raw memory image
- VirtualBox – **Don't suspend**
  - .sav file = machine state from snapshot
    - Ability to acquire guest memory using built-in VBoxManage.exe
      - `vboxmanage debugvm <machinename> dumpvmcore → filename guest.dump`

# Digital Evidence in memory

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
- Process Artifacts
- Running services
- Clipboard Information
- Browsing Sessions
- Passwords
- Network Artifacts
- Accessed Files and other media
- Registry Artifacts
- User Activity
- Chats/Running Application stored data



# Key Memory Components

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# Virtual & Physical Address Spaces



# Volatility Framework

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# Volatility Framework

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- **Purpose:**

- Extracting – analyzing information from memory dumps
- Uncovers insights related to processes, network connections, registry hives, and more.

- **Supported Platforms:**

- Windows (XP to Windows 10/11), Linux, macOS.

- **Key Features:**

- **Plugin Architecture**
- **Cross-Platform Support**
- **Profile-Based Analysis**
- **Wide Range of Artifacts**

# Volatility Framework Plugins (1/3)

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- **imageinfo**

- Identifies the appropriate profile for the image given
- `python3 vol.py -f <image_file> imageinfo`

- **Command example:**

- `python3 vol.py -f <image_file> --profile=<profile> <plugin>`
- `python3 vol.py -f image.bin --profile=WinXPSP2x86 psxview`

- **Volatility 2.6 - Either vol.py or standalone (.exe)**

- `python3 vol.py`
- `.\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe`

# Volatility Framework Plugins (2/3)

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- **pslist - Process List:**
  - Displays a list of all running processes, including their Process ID (PID), parent PID, and other relevant information.
  - Command: "volatility -f <memory\_dump> --profile=<profile> pslist"
- **pstree - Process Tree:**
  - Shows the hierarchical relationship between processes, including parent and child processes.
  - Command: "volatility -f <memory\_dump> --profile=<profile> pstree"
- **psscan - Process Scan:**
  - Scans the memory for terminated or hidden processes that might not be visible in traditional process lists.
  - Command: "volatility -f <memory\_dump> --profile=<profile> psscan"
- **dlllist - DLL List:**
  - Lists all loaded dynamic link libraries (DLLs) for each process.
  - Command: "volatility -f <memory\_dump> --profile=<profile> dlllist"
- **handles - Handles:**
  - Enumerates open handles for each process, including file handles, registry keys, and other resources.
  - Command: "volatility -f <memory\_dump> --profile=<profile> handles"

# Volatility Framework Plugins (3/3)

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- **getsids - GetSIDs:**
  - Retrieves the Security Identifiers (SIDs) associated with each process.
  - Command: "volatility -f <memory\_dump> --profile=<profile> getsids"
- **filescan - File Scan:**
  - Scans the memory for file-related objects and displays information about open files.
  - Command: "volatility -f <memory\_dump> --profile=<profile> filescan"
- **malfind - Malicious Find:**
  - Identifies potentially malicious code or injected DLLs within the memory.
  - Command: "volatility -f <memory\_dump> --profile=<profile> malfind"
- **cmdline - Command-Line:**
  - Retrieves the command-line arguments used to launch each process.
  - Command: "volatility -f <memory\_dump> --profile=<profile> cmdline"
- **netscan - Network Connections:**
  - Displays information about active network connections and listening ports.
  - Command: "volatility -f <memory\_dump> --profile=<profile> netscan"






# Windows Memory Analysis

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# Windows Process Genealogy



<sup>1</sup> Created by an instance of `smss.exe` that exits, so analysis tools usually do not provide the parent process name.

<sup>2</sup> Created by an instance of `userinit.exe` that exits, so analysis tools usually do not provide the parent process name.

<sup>3</sup> Present only when **Credential Guard** is enabled. Functionality of `lsass.exe` is split between itself and this process.

Source: [13cubed.com](https://13cubed.com)

# Process Analyzing – Identify rogue processes

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## Indicators of Rogue Processes:

- **Unusual Process Names:**
  - suspicious or misspelled names that mimic legitimate processes.
- **Mismatched Parent-Child Relationships:**
  - unusual parent-child relationships
- **Unusual Network Activity:**
  - processes with suspicious outbound or inbound traffic
- **Account Activity:**
  - processes owned by unusual accounts
- **Unauthorized DLLs:**
  - processes loading DLLs from uncommon or unauthorized locations.

# Process Analyzing – Identify rogue processes – Volatility Plugins

- **pslist:**
  - Shows the offset, process name, process ID, the parent process ID, number of threads, number of handles, and date/time when the process started and exited.
  - It does not detect hidden or unlinked processes

```
rennux@rennux:~$ vol.py pslist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Offset(V)      Name          PID  PPID  Thds  Hnds  Sess  Wow64  Start                               Exit
-----
0xfffffaf8f430946c0 System        4    0    119   0    -----  0  2023-02-28 15:09:37 UTC+0000
0xfffffaf8f440a8800 smss.exe     308   4     2     0    -----  0  2023-02-28 15:09:37 UTC+0000
0xfffffaf8f442b7080 csrss.exe    408  400    10     0     0  0  2023-02-28 15:09:39 UTC+0000
0xfffffaf8f44dcc800 smss.exe     468  308     0    -----  1  0  2023-02-28 15:09:39 UTC+0000  2023-02-28 15:09:40 UTC+0000
0xfffffaf8f44dc2080 csrss.exe    476  468    12     0     1  0  2023-02-28 15:09:39 UTC+0000
0xfffffaf8f44dfb080 wininit.exe  496  400     1     0     0  0  2023-02-28 15:09:39 UTC+0000
...
```

# Process Analyzing – Identify rogue processes – Volatility Plugins

- **pstree:**
  - This enumerates processes using the same technique as “pslist” plugin
  - It does not detect hidden or unlinked processes
  - Identifies the parent/children from pslist and shows them as a tree.

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
```

Name	Pid	PPid	Thds	Hnds	Time
0xfffffaf8f442b7080:csrss.exe	488	480	10	0	2023-02-28 15:09:39 UTC+0000
0xfffffaf8f44dfb080:wininit.exe	496	480	1	0	2023-02-28 15:09:39 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffaf8f44664800:services.exe	688	496	5	0	2023-02-28 15:09:40 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffaf8f446fc580:svchost.exe	896	688	52	0	2023-02-28 15:09:41 UTC+0000
0xfffffaf8f430946c0:System	4	0	119	0	2023-02-28 15:09:37 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffaf8f440a8800:smss.exe	388	4	2	0	2023-02-28 15:09:37 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffaf8f44dcc800:smss.exe	468	388	0	-----	2023-02-28 15:09:39 UTC+0000
... 0xfffffaf8f442b6080:winlogon.exe	556	468	5	0	2023-02-28 15:09:40 UTC+0000
.... 0xfffffaf8f45604800:fontdrvhost.exe	968	556	5	0	2023-02-28 15:47:15 UTC+0000
..... 0xfffffaf8f444d4800:PanGPA.exe	3392	3216	11	0	2023-02-28 15:47:15 UTC+0000
..... 0xfffffaf8f45b87800:vm3dservice.exe	536	3216	4	0	2023-02-28 15:47:12 UTC+0000
..... 0xfffffaf8f45a88800:WINWORD.EXE	3676	3216	30	0	2023-02-28 15:49:25 UTC+0000
..... 0xfffffaf8f43e90080:ai.exe	844	3676	8	0	2023-02-28 15:49:26 UTC+0000
..... 0xfffffaf8f44488080:vmtoolsd.exe	2936	3216	8	0	2023-02-28 15:47:13 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffaf8f44dc2080:csrss.exe	476	468	12	0	2023-02-28 15:09:39 UTC+0000
.. 0xfffffaf8f44cb6780:MemCompression	1980	4	20	0	2023-02-28 15:09:42 UTC+0000
0xfffffaf8f45a77080:whoami.exe	3380	4188	0	-----	2023-02-28 15:50:24 UTC+0000

# Process Analyzing – Identify rogue processes – Volatility Plugins

- **psscan:**
  - This can find processes that previously terminated (inactive) and processes that have been hidden or unlinked by a rootkit.
  - If a process has previously terminated, the Time exited field will show the exit time.
  - Identifies the parent/children from pslist and shows them as a tree.

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

Offset(V)	Name	PID	PPID	Thds	Hnds	Sess	Wow64	Start	Exit
0x810b1660	System	4	0	58	379	-----	0		
0xff2ab020	smss.exe	544	4	3	21	-----	0	2010-08-11 06:06:21 UTC+0000	
0xff1ecda0	csrss.exe	608	544	10	410	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:23 UTC+0000	
0xff1ec978	winlogon.exe	632	544	24	536	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:23 UTC+0000	
0xff247020	services.exe	676	632	16	288	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000	
0xff255020	lsass.exe	688	632	21	405	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000	
0xff218230	vmacthlp.exe	844	676	1	37	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000	
0x80ff88d8	svchost.exe	856	676	29	336	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000	
0xff217560	svchost.exe	936	676	11	288	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000	
0x80fbf910	svchost.exe	1028	676	88	1424	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000	
0xff22d558	svchost.exe	1088	676	7	93	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:25 UTC+0000	
0xff203b80	svchost.exe	1148	676	15	217	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:26 UTC+0000	
0xff1d7da0	spoolsv.exe	1432	676	14	145	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:26 UTC+0000	
0xff1b8b28	vmtoolsd.exe	1668	676	5	225	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:35 UTC+0000	
0xff1fdc88	VMUpgradeHelper	1788	676	5	112	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:38 UTC+0000	
0xff143b28	TPAutoConnSvc.e	1968	676	5	106	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:39 UTC+0000	
0xff25a7e0	alg.exe	216	676	8	120	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:39 UTC+0000	
0xff364310	wscntfy.exe	888	1028	1	40	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:49 UTC+0000	
0xff38b5f8	TPAutoConnect.e	1084	1968	1	68	0	0	2010-08-11 06:06:52 UTC+0000	
0x80f60da0	wuauclt.exe	1732	1028	7	189	0	0	2010-08-11 06:07:44 UTC+0000	
0xff3865d0	explorer.exe	1724	1708	13	326	0	0	2010-08-11 06:09:29 UTC+0000	
0xff3667e8	VMwareTray.exe	432	1724	1	60	0	0	2010-08-11 06:09:31 UTC+0000	
0xff374980	VMwareUser.exe	452	1724	8	207	0	0	2010-08-11 06:09:32 UTC+0000	
0x80f94588	wuauclt.exe	468	1028	4	142	0	0	2010-08-11 06:09:37 UTC+0000	
0xff224020	cmd.exe	124	1668	0	-----	0	0	2010-08-15 19:17:55 UTC+0000	2010-08-15 19:17:56 UTC+0000

pslist

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

Offset(P)	Name	PID	PPID	PDB	Time created	Time exited
0x00000000010c3da0	wuauclt.exe	1732	1028	0x06cc02c0	2010-08-11 06:07:44 UTC+0000	
0x00000000010f7588	wuauclt.exe	468	1028	0x06cc0180	2010-08-11 06:09:37 UTC+0000	
0x0000000001122910	svchost.exe	1028	676	0x06cc0120	2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000	
0x000000000115b8d8	svchost.exe	856	676	0x06cc00e0	2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000	
0x0000000001214660	System	4	0	0x00319000		
0x000000000211ab28	TPAutoConnSvc.e	1968	676	0x06cc0260	2010-08-11 06:06:39 UTC+0000	
0x00000000049c15f8	TPAutoConnect.e	1084	1968	0x06cc0220	2010-08-11 06:06:52 UTC+0000	
0x0000000004a065d0	explorer.exe	1724	1708	0x06cc0280	2010-08-11 06:09:29 UTC+0000	
0x0000000004b5a980	VMwareUser.exe	452	1724	0x06cc0300	2010-08-11 06:09:32 UTC+0000	
0x0000000004be97e8	VMwareTray.exe	432	1724	0x06cc02e0	2010-08-11 06:09:31 UTC+0000	
0x0000000004c2b310	wscntfy.exe	888	1028	0x06cc0200	2010-08-11 06:06:49 UTC+0000	
0x0000000005471020	smss.exe	544	4	0x06cc0020	2010-08-11 06:06:21 UTC+0000	
0x0000000005f027e0	alg.exe	216	676	0x06cc0240	2010-08-11 06:06:39 UTC+0000	
0x0000000005f47020	lsass.exe	688	632	0x06cc00a0	2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000	
0x0000000006015020	services.exe	676	632	0x06cc0080	2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000	
0x00000000061ef558	svchost.exe	1088	676	0x06cc0140	2010-08-11 06:06:25 UTC+0000	
0x0000000006238020	cmd.exe	124	1668	0x06cc02a0	2010-08-15 19:17:55 UTC+0000	2010-08-15 19:17:56 UTC+0000
0x0000000006384230	vmacthlp.exe	844	676	0x06cc00c0	2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000	
0x00000000063c5560	svchost.exe	936	676	0x06cc0100	2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000	
0x0000000006499b80	svchost.exe	1148	676	0x06cc0160	2010-08-11 06:06:26 UTC+0000	
0x00000000065fc88	VMUpgradeHelper	1788	676	0x06cc01e0	2010-08-11 06:06:38 UTC+0000	
0x00000000066f0978	winlogon.exe	632	544	0x06cc0060	2010-08-11 06:06:23 UTC+0000	
0x00000000066f0da0	csrss.exe	608	544	0x06cc0040	2010-08-11 06:06:23 UTC+0000	
0x00000000069a7328	spoolsv.exe	1432	676	0x06cc01a0	2010-08-11 06:06:26 UTC+0000	
0x00000000069a7328	Vmip.exe	1944	124	0x06cc0320	2010-08-15 19:17:55 UTC+0000	2010-08-15 19:17:56 UTC+0000
0x00000000069a7328	vmtoolsd.exe	1668	676	0x06cc01c0	2010-08-11 06:06:35 UTC+0000	

psscan

# Process Analyzing - Identify rogue processes - Volatility Plugins

- **psxview:**

- Uses different mechanisms to search for processes and shows a comparison between them.
- Good for finding discrepancies (i.e. processes hidden by the attacker).
- A "False" in any column indicates that the respective process is missing.

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Offset(P) Name PID pslist psscan thrddproc pspcid csrss session deskthrd ExitTime
-----
```

0x06015020	services.exe	676	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x063c5560	svchost.exe	936	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x06499b80	svchost.exe	1148	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x04c2b310	wscntfy.exe	888	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x049c15f8	TPAutoConnect.e	1084	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x05f027e0	alg.exe	216	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x05f47020	lsass.exe	688	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x010f7588	wuauclt.exe	468	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x01122910	svchost.exe	1028	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x069d5b28	vmtoolsd.exe	1668	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x06384230	vmacthlp.exe	844	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x0115b8d8	svchost.exe	856	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x04b5a980	VMwareUser.exe	452	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x010c3da0	wuauclt.exe	1732	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x04a065d0	explorer.exe	1724	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x04be97e8	VMwareTray.exe	432	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x0211ab28	TPAutoConnSvc.e	1968	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x06945da0	spoolsv.exe	1432	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x066f0978	winlogon.exe	632	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x0655fc88	VMUpgradeHelper	1788	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x061cf550	services.exe	1088	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	True	
0x06238020	cmd.exe	124	True	True	False	True	False	False	False	False	2010-08-15 19:17:56 UTC+0000
0x05471020	csrss.exe	608	True	True	True	True	False	True	True	True	
0x00000000	smss.exe										
0x00000000	system	4	True	True	True	True	False	False	False	False	
0x069a7328	VMip.exe	1944	False	True	False	False	False	False	False	False	2010-08-15 19:17:56 UTC+0000

# Process Analyzing – Process Object Analysis

- **cmdline:**
  - Displays the process command-line arguments.
  - This plugin can be used to detect whether the process is launched using a malicious command or not.

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
*****
System pid:      4
*****
smss.exe pid:    544
Command line :   \SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe
*****
csrss.exe pid:   608
Command line :   C:\WINDOWS\system32\csrss.exe ObjectDirectory=\Windows SharedSection=1024,3072,512 Windows=0n SubSystemType=Windows ServerDll=basesrv,1 ServerDll=winsrv:UserServerDllInitialization,3 ServerDll=win
srv:ConServerDllInitialization,2 ProfileControl=Off MaxRequestThreads=16
*****
winlogon.exe pid: 632
Command line :   winlogon.exe
*****
services.exe pid: 676
Command line :   C:\WINDOWS\system32\services.exe
*****
lsass.exe pid:   688
Command line :   C:\WINDOWS\system32\lsass.exe
*****
vmacthlp.exe pid: 844
Command line :   "C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmacthlp.exe"
*****
```



# Process Analyzing – Process Object Analysis

- **dlllist:**

- Displays a process's loaded DLLs
- The load count column tells you if a DLL was statically loaded (i.e. as a result of being in the exe or another DLL's import table) or dynamically loaded.

```
svchost.exe pid:      856
Command line : C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost -k DcomLaunch
Service Pack 2
```

Base	Size	LoadCount	LoadTime	Path
0x01000000	0x6000	0xffff		C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe
0x7c900000	0xb0000	0xffff		C:\WINDOWS\system32\ntdll.dll
0x7c800000	0xf4000	0xffff		C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll
0x77dd0000	0x9b000	0xffff		C:\WINDOWS\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
0x77e70000	0x91000	0xffff		C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll
0x5cb70000	0x26000	0x1		C:\WINDOWS\system32\ShimEng.dll
0x6f880000	0x1ca000	0x1		C:\WINDOWS\AppPatch\AcGenral.DLL
0x77d40000	0x90000	0x85		C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dll
0x77f10000	0x46000	0x61		C:\WINDOWS\system32\GDI32.dll
0x76b40000	0x2d000	0x4		C:\WINDOWS\system32\WINMM.dll
0x774e0000	0x13c000	0x14		C:\WINDOWS\system32\ole32.dll
0x77c10000	0x58000	0x97		C:\WINDOWS\system32\msvcrt.dll
0x77120000	0x8c000	0xb		C:\WINDOWS\system32\OLEAUT32.dll
0x77be0000	0x15000	0x1		C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSACM32.dll
0x77c00000	0x8000	0x8		C:\WINDOWS\system32\VERSION.dll
0x7c9c0000	0x814000	0x4		C:\WINDOWS\system32\SHELL32.dll
0x77f60000	0x76000	0x10		C:\WINDOWS\system32\SHLWAPI.dll
0x769c0000	0xb3000	0x4		C:\WINDOWS\system32\USERENV.dll
0x5ad70000	0x38000	0x1		C:\WINDOWS\system32\UxTheme.dll
0x773d0000	0x102000	0x4		C:\WINDOWS\WinSxS\x86_Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls_6595b64144ccf1df_6.0.2600.2180_x-ww_a841ff9\comctl32.dll
0x5d090000	0x97000	0x2		C:\WINDOWS\system32\comctl32.dll
0x77690000	0x21000	0x1		C:\WINDOWS\system32\NTMARTA.DLL
0x76f60000	0x2c000	0x3		C:\WINDOWS\system32\WLDAP32.dll

# Process Analyzing – Process Object Analysis

- **handles:**

- Enumerates open handles for each process.
- Applies to files, registry keys, mutexes, named pipes, events, window stations, desktops, threads, and all other types of objects

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1				
Offset(V)	Pid	Handle	Access Type	Details
0x810b1660	4	0x4	0x1f0fff Process	System(4)
0x810b0020	4	0x8	0x0 Thread	TID 12 PID 4
0xe10192c0	4	0xc	0xf003f Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\SESSION MANAGER\MEMORY MANAGEMENT\PREFETCHPARAMETERS
0xe1019880	4	0x10	0x0 Key	
0xe13b4578	4	0x14	0x2001f Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\SETUP
0xe101d140	4	0x18	0x20019 Key	MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\SYSTEM\MULTIFUNCTIONADAPTER
0xe13b46e0	4	0x1c	0x20019 Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\WPA\MEDIACENTER
0xe13b4748	4	0x20	0x20019 Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\WPA\KEY-CJ27J3P2XV9J9JCPB4DVT
0xe13b4678	4	0x24	0x20019 Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\WPA\PNP
0xe13b45e0	4	0x28	0x20019 Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\WPA\SIGNINGHASH-6KCM6KFTX6MD62
0xe13be4a8	4	0x2c	0x2001f Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\PRODUCTOPTIONS
0xe13be308	4	0x30	0x20019 Key	MACHINE\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\EVENTLOG

# Network Artifacts & Memory

---

## Indicators of Abnormal Network Activity:

- Processes that run over ports 80,443 or 8080 and are NOT browsers
- Browsers that do not run over ports 80,443 or 8080
- Unexplained communications with internal or external IP addresses
- Web requests directly to IP addresses (not domain names)
- Unauthorized RDP connections (port 3389) or other remote access protocol
- Communications with domain names that have malicious reputation


# Network Artifacts & Memory

- **netscan:**

- Scans for network artifacts.
- It finds TCP endpoints, TCP listeners, UDP endpoints, and UDP listeners.
- It distinguishes between IPv4 and IPv6, prints the local and remote IP (if applicable), the local and remote port (if applicable), the time when the socket was bound or when the connection was established, and the current state (for TCP connections only).

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Offset(P)      Proto  Local Address      Foreign Address    State      Pid    Owner      Created
0x8680000dd010 UDPv4  0.0.0.0:3702      *:*                *:*        2900   svchost.exe 2023-02-28 15:09:47 UTC+0000
0x8680000f6ab0 UDPv4  0.0.0.0:0         *:*                *:*        896    svchost.exe 2023-02-28 15:09:42 UTC+0000
0x8680000f6ab0 UDPv6  :::0              *:*                *:*        896    svchost.exe 2023-02-28 15:09:42 UTC+0000
0x8680001272d0 UDPv4  0.0.0.0:500      *:*                *:*        896    svchost.exe 2023-02-28 15:09:42 UTC+0000
...
...
...
00xaf8f43b13540 TCPv4  172.16.35.129:49969 20.0.219.79:443  ESTABLISHED 4752   netwifi.exe 2023-02-28 15:49:31 UTC+0000
```

# Code Injection - Remote DLL Injection



# Detecting DLL Injection & Malicious Code

- **malfind:**

- Finds hidden and injected code.
- Only processes with the **MZ** parameter in the header and **PAGE\_EXECUTE\_READWRITE** in the vad tags are important.
- Normal processes executed with **PAGE\_EXECUTE\_WRITE** and **PAGE\_EXECUTE\_READWRITE** are malicious.
- The -W flag refines the output only showing regions with an MZ header or that start with well known opcode combinations

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Process: svchost.exe Pid: 856 Address: 0xb70000
Vad Tag: VadS Protection: PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
Flags: CommitCharge: 38, MemCommit: 1, PrivateMemory: 1, Protection: 6

0x000000000000b70000  4d 5a 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00  MZ .....
0x000000000000b70010  b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00  @.....
0x000000000000b70020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
0x000000000000b70030  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d0 00 00  .....
```

# Suspicious process and files dumping (1/3)

---

- **procdump:**

- Dumps a process's executable

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
```

```
*****
```

```
Dumping csrss.exe, pid: 296 output: executable.296.exe
```

- **memdump:**

- Extracts all memory resident pages in a process into an individual file.

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.4
```

```
*****
```

```
Writing System [ 4] to 4.dmp
```

# Suspicious process and files dumping (2/3)

## ▪ dlldump:

- Extracts a DLL from a process's memory space in order to proceed to further analysis.
- If the extraction fails, it probably means that some of the memory pages in that DLL were not memory resident (due to paging).
- To dump a PE file that doesn't exist in the DLLs list (for example, due to code injection or malicious unlinking), just specify the base address of the PE in process memory.

```
python vol.py -f ~/Desktop/win7_trial_64bit.raw --profile=Win7SPox64 dlldump -D dlls/
```

Process(V)	Name	Module Base	Module Name	Result
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
0xfffffa8000ce97fo	smss.exe	0x0000000047a90000	smss.exe	OK:
module.208.176e97fo		.47a90000	.dll	
0xfffffa8000ce97fo	smss.exe	0x0000000076d40000		Error: DllBase is paged
0xfffffa8000c006co	csrss.exe	0x0000000049700000	csrss.exe	OK:
module.296.176006co		.49700000	.dll	



# Suspicious process and files dumping (3/3)

---

- **Dumpregistry:**

- Dumps registry hives for further analysis
- By default the plugin will dump all registry files
- Must specify the virtual offset for a specific hive in order to only dump one registry at a time.

# Exploring registry - Finding persistency (2/2)

---

- **printkey:**

- Displays the subkeys, values, data, and data types contained within a specified registry key

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
```

```
Legend: (S) = Stable (V) = Volatile
```

```
-----
```

```
Registry: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\WINDOWS\system32\config\software
```

```
Key name: Run (S)
```

```
Last updated: 2010-06-10 16:13:03 UTC+0000
```

```
Subkeys:
```

```
Values:
```

```
REG_SZ VMware Tools : (S) "C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMwareTray.exe"
```

```
REG_SZ VMware User Process : (S) "C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\VMwareUser.exe"
```

# Exploring registry - Other Useful plugins (1/3)

- **userassist:**

- Prints Userassist registry keys and information, which include all the programs that the user ran.

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
-----
Registry: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\Administrator\NTUSER.DAT
Path: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{5E6AB780-7743-11CF-A12B-00AA004AE837}\Count
Last updated: 2010-06-10 16:11:44 UTC+0000

Subkeys:

Values:

REG_BINARY      UEME_CTLSESSION : Raw Data:
0x00000000      00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
-----
Registry: \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Documents and Settings\Administrator\NTUSER.DAT
Path: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\{75048700-EF1F-11D0-9888-006097DEACF9}\Count
Last updated: 2010-08-15 19:17:23 UTC+0000

Subkeys:

Values:

REG_BINARY      UEME_CTLSESSION : Raw Data:
0x00000000      d7 c8 59 0e 02 00 00 00 ..Y.....

REG_BINARY      UEME_RUNPIDL:%csidl2%\MSN.lnk :
ID:              1
Count:           14
Last updated:    2010-06-10 16:10:27 UTC+0000
Raw Data:
0x00000000      01 00 00 00 13 00 00 00 56 24 cf 70 b7 08 cb 01 .....V$.p....

REG_BINARY      UEME_RUNPIDL:%csidl2%\Windows Media Player.lnk :
ID:              1
Count:           13
Last updated:    2010-06-10 16:10:27 UTC+0000
Raw Data:
0x00000000      01 00 00 00 12 00 00 00 56 24 cf 70 b7 08 cb 01 .....V$.p....

REG_BINARY      UEME_RUNPIDL:%csidl2%\Windows Messenger.lnk :
ID:              1
Count:           12
Last updated:    2010-06-10 16:10:27 UTC+0000
Raw Data:
0x00000000      01 00 00 00 11 00 00 00 56 24 cf 70 b7 08 cb 01 .....V$.p....
```

# Exploring registry – Other Useful plugins (2/3)

---

- **shellbags:**

- Prints Shellbags info, which are a set of registry keys that allow the Windows operating system to track user window viewing preferences specific to Windows Explorer.
- Some artifacts that can be found here:
  - Icon and folder view settings
  - Windows sizes and preferences
  - Metadata such as MAC timestamps
  - Most Recently Used (MRU) files and file type (zip, directory, installer)
  - Files, folders, zip files, and installers that existed at one point on the system (even if deleted)
  - Network shares and folders within the shares

# Exploring registry – Other Useful plugins (3/3)

---

- **hashdump:**

- Extracts cached domain credentials stored in the registry.
- Hashes can be cracked using John the Ripper, rainbow tables, etc.

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
```

```
Administrator:500:e52cac67419a9a224a3b108f3fa6cb6d:8846f7eaae8fb117ad06bdd830b7586c:::
```

```
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
```

```
HelpAssistant:1000:4e857c004024e53cd538de64dedac36b:842b4013c45a3b8fec76ca54e5910581:::
```

```
SUPPORT_388945a0:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8f57385a61425fc7874c3268aa249ea1:::
```

# Searching for privilege escalation

- **privs:**

- Shows you which process privileges are present, enabled, and/or enabled by default.

```
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Pid Process Value Privilege Attributes Description
-----
```

4	System	7	SeTcbPrivilege	Present,Enabled,Default	Act as part of the operating system
4	System	2	SeCreateTokenPrivilege	Present	Create a token object
4	System	9	SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege	Present	Take ownership of files/objects
4	System	15	SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	Present,Enabled,Default	Create a pagefile
4	System	4	SeLockMemoryPrivilege	Present,Enabled,Default	Lock pages in memory
4	System	3	SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege	Present	Replace a process-level token
4	System	5	SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege	Present	Increase quotas
4	System	14	SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege	Present,Enabled,Default	Increase scheduling priority
4	System	16	SeCreatePermanentPrivilege	Present,Enabled,Default	Create permanent shared objects
4	System	20	SeDebugPrivilege	Present,Enabled,Default	Debug programs
4	System	21	SeAuditPrivilege	Present,Enabled,Default	Generate security audits
4	System	8	SeSecurityPrivilege	Present	Manage auditing and security log
4	System	22	SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege	Present	Edit firmware environment values
4	System	23	SeChangeNotifyPrivilege	Present,Enabled,Default	Receive notifications of changes to files or directories
4	System	17	SeBackupPrivilege	Present	Backup files and directories
4	System	18	SeRestorePrivilege	Present	Restore files and directories
4	System	19	SeShutdownPrivilege	Present	Shut down the system
4	System	10	SeLoadDriverPrivilege	Present	Load and unload device drivers
4	System	13	SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege	Present,Enabled,Default	Profile a single process
4	System	12	SeSystemtimePrivilege	Present	Change the system time
4	System	25	SeUndockPrivilege	Present	Remove computer from docking station
4	System	28	SeManageVolumePrivilege	Present	Manage the files on a volume
4	System	29	SeImpersonatePrivilege	Present,Enabled,Default	Impersonate a client after authentication
4	System	30	SeCreateGlobalPrivilege	Present,Enabled,Default	Create global objects
544	smss.exe	7	SeTcbPrivilege	Present,Enabled,Default	Act as part of the operating system

Thank you for your patience!

---