

Linux Security Modules

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November 28, 2017

Linux Security Modules

- ▶ SELinux – applied to files (inodes)
- ▶ AppArmor – applied to file paths
- ▶ SMACK – applied to files, mostly used in embedded systems
- ▶ grsecurity – not mainlined, stable patches are no longer free
- ▶ TOMOYO – from NTT, current maintenance unclear
- ▶ Yama

Pros & Cons

- ▶ SELinux – very fine grained control, not going away
- ▶ AppArmor – feasible to write policies by hand, usable on FS w/out extended permissions, not going away
- ▶ SMACK – policies extremely easy to define
- ▶ grsecurity – handles lots of security issues beyond just MAC, stacks with other MAC implementations

Why AppArmor

- ▶ Enabled by default in one of the most common distributions, Ubuntu
- ▶ Relatively straightforward syntax
- ▶ No separate build process for new policies

What does AppArmor do?

Monitor and restrict:

- ▶ file access
- ▶ network access
- ▶ capabilities (chown, mknod, setuid, ...)
 - ▶ man 7 capabilities
- ▶ rlimit (aka ulimit)
- ▶ in general: restrict permissions

AppArmor Components

- ▶ Kernel
- ▶ Userspace Utilities
- ▶ Profiles

Example

```
~ sudo aa-status
apparmor module is loaded.
58 profiles are loaded.
25 profiles are in enforce mode.
/usr/bin/evince
/usr/bin/evince-previewer
/usr/bin/evince-previewer//sanitized_helper
/usr/bin/evince-thumbnailer
/usr/bin/evince-thumbnailer//sanitized_helper
/usr/bin/evince//sanitized_helper
/usr/bin/irssi
/usr/bin/pidgin
/usr/bin/pidgin//launchpad_integration
/usr/bin/pidgin//sanitized_helper
/usr/bin/totem
/usr/bin/totem-audio-preview
/usr/bin/totem-video-thumbnailer
```

Creating Profile

- ▶ Start with aa-genprof (install apparmor-utils on Ubuntu)

```
# aa-genprof /usr/sbin/nginx
```

...

```
[(S)can system log for AppArmor events] / (F)inish
```

```
# #other window
```

```
# service nginx restart
```

- ▶ Do some operations then “S”can message logs, save and quit.. this will be inadequate
- ▶ Set new profile to complain mode with aa-complain and restart service
- ▶ Run tail -f and look for apparmor messages
- ▶ Edit profile to allow required permissions
- ▶ Repeat until warnings are gone
- ▶ Try aa-enforce and fix any further errors
- ▶ Important to run with exact same setup as production

More AppArmor Commands

- ▶ apparmor_parser – core executable
- ▶ aa-autodep – generate profile skeleton
- ▶ aa-cleanprof – remove superfluous rules, reorganize, and remove comments
- ▶ aa-decode: decodes hex strings in kernel log (if present)
- ▶ aa-logprof – interactively change profiles from system log warnings
- ▶ aa-mergeprof – merge profiles

Seccomp(-bpf)

- ▶ Seccomp denies access to all system calls except read, write, and exit.
- ▶ seccomp-bpf is an extension to seccomp that allows specifying a filter that is applied to every system call.

Grsecurity (+ PaX)

- ▶ a (large, 6.2M) patch against Linux kernel
- ▶ security oriented (obviously)
- ▶ started more than 14 years ago, pioneered multiple techniques
- ▶ includes multiple parts: -PaX protection against memory corruption bugs (sometimes called an HIPS)
- ▶ RBAC Role-based access control (not implemented as LSM)
- ▶ Other Generic hardening (memory, filesystem, network protections)

Major features

- ▶ NOEXEC segmentation or pagination-based implementation of NX bit (before it was available on CPUs)
- ▶ MPROTECT W X at the page level: forbid memory pages available both for write and execute, and completes NOEXEC
- ▶ KERNEXEC kernel equivalent of NOEXEC+MPROTECT; prevents injection and execution of foreign code to the kernel
- ▶ ASLR predates the Linux version (actually predates all version), and still an improvement
- ▶ UDEREF prevents the kernel dereferencing userland pointers, like SMEP/SMAP or PXN/PAN on steroid
- ▶ CONSTIFY constify structure containing only function pointers, using a gcc plugin

- ▶ GrSecurity/PaX is no longer offered as a free download and, as a result, almost every publicly available distribution has stopped providing it.
- ▶ KSPP

Yama does Discretionary Access Control of some kernel related functions, like defining if process tracing (ptrace) is allowed.

Firejail

Firejail is a project that uses Linux namespaces and seccomp-bpf to create a sandbox around Linux applications. (show a profile from /etc/firejail)

Other Security Mechanisms

- ▶ PaX
- ▶ seccomp(-bpf) – filtering for system calls
- ▶ capabilities (instead of setuid)
- ▶ sysctl settings
- ▶ systemtap (patching the kernel)
- ▶ compiler features (gcc stack-protector, etc.)
- ▶ namespaces
- ▶ cgroups